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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-2353
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
VINCENT SCIROTTO,
Appellant
_______________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Criminal No. 09-cr-00288-001
(Honorable David S. Cercone)
______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 10, 2012
Before: SCIRICA, ROTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 02, 2012)
_________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________________
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
Vincent Scirotto appeals his fifteen-month sentence following a guilty plea to one
count of making a false declaration in a bankruptcy case in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 152(3). Because we conclude Scirotto validly waived the right to appeal his sentence,
we will affirm.
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I.
Scirotto was released from prison in 2004 and moved into the house of his friend
“CJ.” That December, Scirotto sought to buy a house of his own but did not qualify for a
loan because of poor credit. CJ loaned Scirotto $25,000 for the down payment, and CJ
signed the mortgage in his own name. Scirotto moved into the new house and agreed to
make the monthly mortgage payments, but he failed to do so and quickly fell behind.
Without CJ‟s knowledge, Scirotto filed a bankruptcy petition that included CJ‟s name,
social security number, and other personal identifiers. The petition triggered an automatic
stay provision, preventing the lender from foreclosing. Scirotto hoped this would allow
him enough time to become current on mortgage payments. The provision delayed
foreclosure for several months, but the lender ultimately foreclosed on the house.
In 2009, a grand jury indicted Scirotto for one count of making a materially false
declaration in a bankruptcy petition under 18 U.S.C. § 152(3) (count one) and one count
of perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1621(2) (count two). Scirotto signed a written guilty plea
agreement with the government. Scirotto agreed to plead guilty to count one and the
government agreed to move to dismiss count two and to recommend a two-level
reduction in offense level for acceptance of responsibility. The plea agreement also
provided, “[t]he parties agree that the offense level should be calculated under either §
2B1.1 or § 2J1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines, and they reserve the right to present their
respective positions to the Court.” Section 2B1.1 covers fraud and carries a base offense
level of six; section 2J1.3 covers perjury and carries a base offense level of fourteen.
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In the plea agreement, Scirotto waived his right to take a direct appeal, file a
motion to vacate the sentence, or otherwise collaterally attack the sentence, with three
exceptions: if (1) the government made a direct appeal from the sentence; (2) the
sentence exceeded the statutory limits; or (3) the sentence unreasonably exceeded the
sentencing guideline range determined by the court.
At the change of plea hearing, the District Court conducted an extensive colloquy
with Scirotto under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). Scirotto confirmed he had read and signed
the plea agreement, discussed it with his attorney, and fully understood its contents. He
also testified he was satisfied with the performance of his attorney. The District Court
specifically reviewed the appellate waiver provision with Scirotto. The court confirmed
Scirotto understood the waiver and the rights waived. Scirotto affirmed he had not been
induced to sign the document by any promises not contained in the plea agreement.
In position statements, as anticipated in the plea agreement, the parties disputed
which sentencing guideline applied. Scirotto argued for the use of the fraud provision
with a lower base offense level, § 2B1.1. The government argued for the use of the
perjury provision, § 2J1.3. After reviewing the indictment, the District Court found that
making false representations on a bankruptcy petition was “more akin to perjury than
fraud, thus warranting the application of U.S.S.G. § 2J1.3.” The court set Scirotto‟s base
offense level at twelve after a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. With a
criminal history category of III, Scirotto‟s sentencing guideline range was fifteen to
twenty-one months‟ imprisonment. The court rejected Scirotto‟s plea for a non-custodial
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sentence and sentenced him to the guideline minimum term of fifteen months‟
imprisonment and a $100 assessment.
Scirotto filed a timely notice of appeal with a new attorney. He urges us not to
enforce the appellate waiver, contending former counsel was ineffective during the guilty
plea for failing to preserve for appeal the issue of sentencing guideline selection.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2007)
(holding the court of appeals had subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding a
defendant‟s waiver of appellate rights in a plea agreement). Our review of the validity
and applicability of the appellate waiver in Scirotto‟s plea agreement is de novo. United
States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 237 (3d Cir. 2008).
Where the government invokes a defendant‟s appellate waiver, we must decide the
enforceability of the waiver as a threshold matter. United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921,
926 (3d Cir. 2008). We will decline to review the merits of Scirotto‟s appeal “if we
conclude (1) that the [issue] he pursues on appeal [falls] within the scope of his appellate
waiver and (2) that he knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the appellate waiver, unless
(3) enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 927 (citing United
States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 536 (3d Cir. 2008)).
Scirotto does not dispute that his appeal falls within the scope of the appellate
waiver, nor that he signed the appellate waiver knowingly and voluntarily, and there is
ample evidence in the record to satisfy these requirements. Accordingly, we confine our
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analysis to Scirotto‟s argument that enforcement of the appellate waiver will lead to a
miscarriage of justice.
We have recognized “[t]here may be an unusual circumstance where an error
amounting to a miscarriage of justice may invalidate the waiver.” United States v.
Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001). In Khattak, we identified factors to determine
whether enforcing the waiver creates a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 563. Those factors
are:
The clarity of the error, its gravity, its character (e.g., whether it concerns a
fact issue, a sentencing guideline, or a statutory maximum), the impact of
the error on the defendant, the impact of correcting the error on the
government, and the extent to which the defendant acquiesced in the result.
Id. (quoting United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 2001)). The miscarriage of
justice exception “„will be applied sparingly and without undue generosity.‟” United
States v. Wilson, 429 F.3d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Teeter, 257 F.3d at 26). In
rare circumstances, we have recognized ineffectiveness of counsel may prevent
enforcement of appellate waivers. See United States v. Shedrick, 493 F.3d 292, 301-02
(3d Cir. 2007) (defendant‟s counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to file a timely
appeal raising an issue explicitly exempted from the appellate waiver provision).
Scirotto argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve his right to
appeal the applicable sentencing guideline, and that enforcing the waiver will create a
miscarriage of justice. We disagree. Scirotto reaped significant benefits by pleading
guilty. The government agreed to move to dismiss count two and recommend a two-point
sentencing reduction. Furthermore, unlike the rare circumstances where we have found
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ineffective counsel created a miscarriage of justice, enforcing the waiver here will not
deprive Scirotto of rights retained in the agreement, but effectuate both parties‟
expectations under the agreement. The agreement expressly anticipated the dispute over
whether the fraud or the perjury guideline would be applied at sentencing, and reserved
that issue. That is exactly what occurred. Enforcing Scirotto‟s appellate waiver does not
give rise to a miscarriage of justice.1
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will enforce the appellate waiver in Scirotto‟s plea
agreement and affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.

1

Assuming we were to reach the merits, it appears that defendant cannot prevail. We
review de novo the District Court‟s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. United
States v. Aquino, 555 F.3d 124, 127 (3d Cir. 2009). When the offense of conviction falls
under multiple Guideline provisions, the District Court is to determine the applicable
provision based solely on “the offense conduct charged in the count of the indictment or
information of which the defendant was convicted.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a). As the District
Court found, the indictment charged Scirotto with knowingly making a material false
declaration under penalty of perjury that “CJ was seeking relief under the bankruptcy
code by forging the signature of CJ on the voluntary petition” for bankruptcy. The
indictment did not characterize Scirotto‟s actions “as being part of a plan to avoid making
payment to specific creditors.” United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 836 (4th Cir.
2010). Accordingly, the District Court was correct to apply the perjury provision, § 2J1.3.
See id. at 836-37.
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